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A irlift is a responsibility tha t could be, like the space effort, 
either p re dominantly mil itary or civilian . The economics of air -
l ift is of such importance that this responsibility cannot b e proper l y 
assesse d without including the strategic and political factors also . 
This study was undertaken to attempt to establish a n airlift 
policy tha t would incorporate a ll of the above factors and yet be mor e 
dfic.ient than a policy which gave the responsibility of airlift solely to 
the military, or to the commercial carriers . 
The author's interest was stimulate d by twenty years of military 
service, eight of which was in the Military Air Transport S ervice 
(MATS) . Durin g this period the author made numerous trips to Air 
Force D epots, in the United S tates and overseas , to co - ordinate main-
tenance matters for P acific Division, MATS. He was the maintenance 
representative for P acific D ivision, MAT S , on the Civil Reserve Air 
F l eet (CRAF) pro gram, and as such c ondu cte d investigations through-
i i 
out the P acifi c area on t he condition of CRAF facilities . 
However, re liance on the opinions of p e rsons knowledgeable in 
aviation was made, and special acknowl e d gement is due the following 
ll 
p ersons whose views are wide l y respected in aviation circles: 
Honorable A . M. Monroney , S enator, Ok l ahoma 
James E . Moore, Vice P resident-Traffic, United Air L ines 
Robert W. S mart, Chief Counsel for Armed Services Committee, 
House of Representatives 




Purpos e .-- The purposes of this paper are to analyze past air-
lift conditions, show why airlift should be adopted, and to d etermine an 
effective airlift policy and method of operation that would provide the 
Un ited States an economical, flexible, and efficient a irlift force, help-
ing to ensure the security of the nation . 
Scope. --This study will be concerned with the development of an 
effective airlift policy. It will determine which type of airlift force 
would be most e ffici ent --pr imari l y military, a balanced force of mili-
tar y and commercial carriers , or, primarily commercial. Obviously, 
however, there are factors other than economic ones which have to be 
consid ered in the final specifications of an airlift force; these are poli-
tical and strategic factors . For instanc e , if one decision required the 
closing of a military base in a community, there would probably be op-
position from members of Congress serving that district. An excellent 
of the type of Congressional protest that may deve l op is the opposition 
recently given to S ecretary of D efense Robert W. M c Namara in his pro-
posa ls to close some naval shipyards on the east coast . There could be 
opposition for strategic reasons from the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the reac-
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tion time of the com mercial carriers was not what the J oint C hiefs 
considered accep t a b l e . 
Objectives of A irlift . --In evaluating the na tion ' s a i r lift force and 
methods of operat i on i t i s necessary first to d e t ermine what this air -
l ift force should h ave as ob jectives . The n a tional g oa l s sel ect e d by t h e 
author are ones tha t sho uld serve t he nation as a whol e, and they are by 
no means the onl y ones applicabl e . They were cho sen a fter c onsid ering 
the entire air lift re s ources of the Un i ted S tates as b eing availab l e for 
service . The goals selected are the fo llowing : 
1. R ecognition that a i rlift, because of i ts abili ty to d epl oy per -
sonnel in l a r ge force quickly to any p lace in the wor ld , serves 
as an a r m of t he Unit e d Stat es in car r ying out its foreign p olicy . 
The Military A ir Transport S ervice (MATS ) ha s b een ut ili zed 
in this capaci ty in the past . The exam p l es li sted bel ow, which 
indicate h ow airlif t has been used as an ins t rum ent o f nation al 
p olicy to influ ence w o r l d opinion, h ave b een ext ract e d f rom a n 
undated MATS l etter , " W h a t I s Globa l A irlift ? " 
a. Mo vement of this nation ' s mighti es t ope r a tional missiles . 
b. Rap id strategi c d eployment of this nation 's m ili tary strike 
fo rce s t o wherever in the wor l d th ey are n ee d e d . 
c. F ast reaction to war a l er t to p roduce a c on tinuo us flo w o f 
e q uipm ent to armed. forces a l ready a t the front , and t o re -
supply our acti ve com bat elem ent s . 
r 
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d. Special mis s ions into r emote areas with high - value and 
delicate scientific e quipment, or with urgently needed 
replacement items . 
e . A irdropping of supplies to remote scientific stations near 
the So uth P o l e, the Arctic Circle, and in other areas of 
the world; airdropping of foodstuffs, and supplies, and 
even pararescuemen to disaster sites around the world; 
and ai rdropping of paratroopers and combat weapons 
from formations of airlift aircraft. 
f. Humanitarian airlift of sup p l ies , m e dical e quipment, 
communicat ion e quipment , rescue and surviva l and 
m e dical speciali sts to countri es hard hit b y natura l 
dis aste rs or epide mics. 
g . A erom e dical evac uation missions across both oceans 
(and within the Unite d States ) . 
h . Routine resuppl y daily over 11 5, 000 miles of air routes 
to D epartment of Defense combat forces throughout the 
free wo r ld. 
i. Massive exercises, moving thousands of army troops 
and hundr e d s of tons of combat gear to and f rom mane u-
vers, both in this country and overseas . 
j . Imm e diate, m assive airlifts as an instrument of na tional 
d efense policy, such as the renowne d Berlin Airlift in 
1948 and the now-famous Congo air l ift which began in 
J ul y, 1960 , for the United States. 
2. An airlift force that has the capability of immediate 
response to any changes in strategy with sufficient flexi-
b ility to meet any emergencies . 
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3. The devel opm ent and support of a healthy aircraft industry 
to aid in the grow th of the nation ' s eco n omi c and industrial 
capacity . 
With the establishm ent of the national goals as a guide to aid in 
the deve lopment of a realistic a irlift policy, a review of airlift back-
g round and history is appropriate . 
CHAPTER II 
DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY AIRLIFT 
History. --The development of airlift as a primary means of 
transportation has a re l atively short history; however, it has been 
an orderly one . The advent of the twin-engine DC- 2, in 1932, gave 
the country its first promise of airlift potential. 1 After the produc-
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tion of 1 30 DC-2 1 s , Donald Douglas, P resident of newl y formed 
Dougla s Aircl"aft Company, took a fi::1ancial gamble and began produc-
tion of the DC- 3, which was to make a remarkabl e record in Wor l d 
War II as a cargo transport. The DC- 3, a twin-engine transport, car-
ried a total of 2 1 passengers and was the first airplane that permitted 
the air lines to make a profit . 2 
W orld W ar II accelerated th e development of the four-engine 
transport aircraft, the Do ugla s DC-4, which was widely used b y the 
"Air Transport Command," the forerunner of MATS. During the Berlin 
Airlift, the Do uglas DC-4 was again used as the primary aircraft for 
suppl ying the city of Berlin. However, more advanced four-engine 
transport aircraft made their appearance, s uch as the Dougl as DC-6 
and the Boeing Stratocruiser . These aircraft could carry lar ger pay-
1P oyntz Tyler, Airways of Ameri ca (New York : H. W. Wilson Co., 
1958), p. 3 1. 
2Ibid.' p . 32. 
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loads, and consequently could do the sam e job as the DC- 4 with fewer 
aircraft . 
The Douglas C -1 24, a four-engine transport aircraft capabl e of 
carrying larger payload s than any aircraft then in service, made its 
debut d uring the Kor ean War, and it was the first time an aircraft was 
specifically des igne d for air liftin g cargo . Althou gh the C-124 increased 
payload capacity considerably over the previous transport aircraft, it 
became apparent that this aircraft still was not the ultimate one for air-
lift because of excessive operating and maintenance costs . 3 
In 1957 1V'.ATS began using the C-133, a large tra.n3-0cear.ic, four-
engine turbo -prop aircraft capabl e of carrying in excess of 30 tons of 
cargo . This aircraft was procured to carry the "out-size cargo, " which 
is the cargo too large to be carried in other transport aircraft. 
Propeller-dnven aircraft were not enough, however, and in 1960 
a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee condu cted hear -
ings which exposed the inadequacy of MATS to perform its "Hard- core 
Mission. " 4 The Subcommittee initiated an interim modernization pro-
gram which, when compl eted, will add 50 C - l30E long range, four -
engine turbo - prop aircraft and 30 C-135 l ong range pure jet aircraft to 
MATS' air lift force. 5 The above aircraft, add ed to the propeller 
3u. S. Congress, Senate, S tud y of Militar y Air Transport S ervice, 
85th Cong ., 2nd S ess . , 1958, p . 33. 
4u. S. Congress, S enate, National Militar y Airlift, 86th Con g., 2nd 
Sess . , 1960, p. 4033 . 
5Ibid.' p. 4048. 
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aircraft a lr ead y possessed, will increase MATS' capability to provide 
air lift until such time as the C-141, a l ong range , fou r - engine jet trans-
port capable of airlifting 68 , 5 00 pounds, is delivered. 
The history of airlift deve l opment has been rapid; and, with the 
d elivery of the C-141, it will have n ot onl y strategic and political value 
but economical value as we ll. 
Background o f MAT S. --MATS was organize d in 1948 as one of the 
major commands within the newly created Air F orce . P rior to this time 
military airlift was performed by two organizations: the A ir Transport 
Command (ATC) o f the A rmy Air Forc e and the Naval Air Transpo"t 
Service (NATS). Ther e were three air transport d ivi sions set up with-
in MATS in 1948, and these were maintained until 1960. They were the 
Atl antic, Continental, and P acific D ivisions . In 1960 MATS reorganize d 
its tra n sport structure, and Continental D ivision was d eactivated . Its 
area of responsibi lity was absorbed b y th.e Atlantic a n d Pac ific Divisions. 
A t lantic D ivision was renamed Eastern Transport Ai r For ce (EAST AF) 
and Pacific Division was renamed W es t ern Transport Ai r Force (WESTAF). 
Unquestionably MAT S ha s been flying passengers and cargo that 
could be air lifte d b y commercial carriers. MATS continues to d o this. 
How ever, it should be explained that the D epartment of D efense, through 
the Joint Chie fs of Staff, is responsible for the assignme nt to MATS of 
what will be airlifted within a specifie d period of time. In the past, if 
MAT S was not capable of air lifting the re qui rement, the excess was 
airlifted b y commercial carriers on contract . 
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MATS was the object of considerable opposition from the com -
mercial carriers and some members of Congress. T his opposition 
led to the "Stud y of the Militar y Air Transport S ervice" 6 conducted 
by the Committee on Interstate and F oreign Commerce of the Unite d 
S tates Senate . It s purpos e was to expl ore the possibilities of giving 
to the commercial carriers the air lift that would be compatibl e with 
their operation. As a result of these and subse qu ent hearings, a ddi-
tional airlift has been as signe d to the commerci a l carriers . Each 
passing year has seen an increase in a ir l ift provided b y the commer -
cial ca.rl."ier s since 1959, as can be seem in Appendix C. 
S ummary. --The d evel opment of transport aircraft has been an 
orderly one. However, the economics of airlift was not given equal 
consid eration with the political and strategic factors until the acquisi-
tion of the interim modernization aircraft. The c ommercial c a rr i ers 
brought to li ght the importance of economics of airlift in the late 195 0' s . 
Consequentl y , it i s taken into consideration in the deve lopment of any 
new transport aircraft . 
6u.s. Congre ss, S enate, S tudy of the Military A ir T ransport 
Service , 85th Gong., 2n d S ess . , 1958 . 
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CHAP TER III 
APPLICATION OF AIRLIFT 
A irlift Advantages . --Airlift has d efinite economic advantages 
over surface transportation because of its speed, flexibility , extended 
range, and reduction of packaging and crating requirements. Because 
of these advantages , economic gains are possible, and one of the major 
areas in which c onsiderable gains have been made is that of l ogistics. 
Tl-:e importanc" of logisti ;:; s in achieving economic gain.s is sho·m1 
in the maintenance of spare parts inventories . The cost of spare parts 
for aircraft increases with technol ogical improvements because the parts 
become more complecated and therefore cost more. A large portion of 
an inventory may becom e practically worthl ess because of techno logical 
changes that no longer require those particular spare parts . 1 A means 
of l owering this cost of obsolescence is by reducing the size of the in -
ventor y of spare parts. The airlift of spare parts, both in the United 
States and overseas, has permitted a reduction in the inventory of spares 
by increasing the spee d and range of transport aircraft. This has de-
creased the en route time of s p are parts from sixteen days to two days, 
thereby d ecreasing the inventory re q uirements . This is shown in Appendix B. 
1u. S. A . F., Spares S tudy Group, Selec tive Man a gement of Material, 
Dayton: 1960, Report No. 10. 
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The Air Force has reduced the spare parts inventory at overseas depots 
to zero according to Gen eral William McKee, Vice Chief of Staff, United 
States Air Force. 2 This resulted in closing five depots located in Africa, 
England, Japan, and the Philippines . 
Airlift, through the medium of speed, permits maintaining the min-
imum number of any item for the Air Force; therefore, it should have 
comparable results for the Arm y and Navy in the words of General John 
P. Doyl e, formerly Director of Transportation, United States Air Force . 3 
According to General Doyle the Army had asked for airlift of $6 million 
per month and the Air Force could not provide it . With the interim air-
craft provided MATS, the C-135 and C-l30E, increased airlift should be 
available for the Arm y and Navy. Though airlift was dir ect l y responsible 
for the re du ction of spare parts requirements and closin g the five major 
over seas depots, there can be no doubt that efficient inventory control 
procedures were a lso instrumental in the economic gains achieved. In-
ventory control procedures have accelerated the requisitioning and pro-
cessing of spare parts . In the past, an Air Force base lo cated overseas 
would complete a requisition form and send it to the area depot; if the 
area depot had the s pare part it would be shipped to the base that needed 
it. If the depot did not have the part in stock, it would submit the re-
quisition to the depot in the United States that was responsible for pro-
vi ding that particular part. The depot in the United S tates would ship 
2"Administrator," Air Fo rce Times, July 29, 1 964, p . 5. 
3u .s. Congress, Senate , Study of Militar y Air Transport 
Service, 85th Con g., 2nd Sess . , 1958, p . 193. 
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the part to the overseas depot for trans - shipment to the original base of 
request . 4 This procedure required days and weeks before receipt of the 
spare part could be expected. 
Airlift and electronic data processing equipment at Air Force bases 
have combined to reduce the time re quired to get de l ivery on a replacement 
part. The data processing equipment permits an Air Force base overseas 
to make known its needs within a matter of minutes to the depot in the 
United States. Airlift is then used to speed the part to the Air Force base. 
A look at Table II, Appendix B, which includes data compiled by an 
A ir Force Spar es S tudy Group of the Air Force Logistics Command, which 
has the responsibility for procurement and support of all Air Force air-
craft, reveals how the expenditure for the initial pur c hase of spares for 
new aircraft and the replenishment of spare parts has been decreased by 
approximately one-third between the years 1956- 196 1. This reduction, 
as a result of airlift and efficient inventory control, does not mean just 
a decr ease in inventory levels; it has a directly related effect on the a-
mount of storage space required. The standard cost figure of $2. 25 per 
square foot for storage space is contained in Air Force Manual 67- 1 and 
it permits a comparison which indicates the potential possible savings 
when storage space is reduced because airiift has reduced the inventory. 
Assume, for exampl e, that each overseas Air Force depot had 2 million 
square feet of space, the c losing of five depots would save l 0 mil l ion 
4"S uppl y Procedures," Air Force Manual 67- 1, Dayton: 1958. 
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square feet of space. If $ 2 . 25 per squa re foot is multiplied by 10 mil-
lion s quar e feet it results in a saving of $22. 5 million. E ven though 
this is only a n estimate of the amount of storage space at each of the 
five overseas d epots , it is a fair l y accurate one when the responsibi -
litie s of a depot are consid ered: stora ge of spare parts, gasoline , vehi-
cles, aircraft , and personal e quipment . 
If airl ift is e xpan d ed to encompas s the re quirements of the A r m y 
and Navy it would permit the closing of additional d epots with resultant 
savings in inventory re quirements, storage space, and personnel . 
Normally, A ir For ce d epots i n the United States emp loyed between 
15 ,000 and 25, 000 personnel while overseas depots had a l ower employ -
ment rate . 5 How ever, for the sake of standardization, it will be ass um ed 
that each overseas de pot employed a combin a tion of 8, 000 m ilitar y a n d 
civilian personnel. This wo uld have resulte d in a d ecrease of 4 0, 000 per-
sonnel, which, based on an a nnual average salary per person of $5,000 
would be a saving of $200 million per year . 6 
The remaining area in which economic ga ins o ccurre d with the 
closing of the five large d e pots was i n the expenditure of operations and 
maintenance fund s . T hese expenditures i nc l ude such ite m s as the cost 
of aviation gasoline, gasoline for a ll type vehicles, road m aintenance, 
5u . S. A. F. , Spares S tudy Group, S e lective Managem ent of M ater ia l , 
Dayton : 1960 , Report No. 10. 
6s tanl ey H. Brewer and Ro ger B. Ulvestad, The C argo J et In 
Militar y Air Transportation (R enton , Wa sh . : 1960) , p . 6 0. 
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repair of aircraft and vehic l es , e lectricity, water, etc. An average 
figure of $10 million of operation and maintenance money for each of 
the five depots which were closed down amounts to a saving of $50 mil-
lion. 7 Here again, economic gains have been the direct result of air-
lift, and expans ion to provide the Army and Navy air lift to satisfy their 
requirements should be accomplished to achieve further economic gains . 
Hi-Valu P rogr am. --Airlift has been used by the A ir F orce Logis -
tics Command to support a program which, in essence , procures the 
minimum number of aircraft and missile parts and maintains a stli.ct 
control over them for the life of the parts. Airlift is the key to sue-
cess of the program , which is called the "Hi-Val u" p rogram . For 
exampl e, a critical part needs repair ; it is air lifte d to the d epot in 
the United States that is responsibl e for the repair of that particular 
part. It is repaire d on a priority basis and air lifted back to the base 
that needs the part. 
The reduction of transportation time has been of critical impor -
tance in the "Hi-Val u" program. A s an exampl e , the Air Force nor -
mally ships ;.pproxim;,_te l y 2 1 aircraft engines8 per day to ~ver-
seas d estinations and each engine has an initial average cost of 
$200, 000; however , some cost as much as $ 5 00, 000 per engine. It 
will be seen that initial investment costs could run quite high if the 
engines were shipped by surface transportation . The Air Force 
7u . S. A. F. Spares S tudy Group, Selective Management of Material, 
Dayton: 1960, Report No. 10. 
8Air Force Form llOB. 
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needs to receive 21 engines of various models over seas each day re -
gardless of whether they are delivered b y a irlift or surfac e transpor-
t a tion. To d etermine the re q uirement fo r 21 engines per day it was 
necessary t o d e termine the average engine life at removal of all air -
craft engines removed at overseas bases and the average number of 
aircraft in the A r m y, A ir Force, and Navy that must be supported. 
There are approximately 2, 600 Air Fo rce , Arm y, and Navy aircraft 
tha t are supported by a ir lift . 9 Considering all types of aircraft in 
use, the average number of engine s installed on each aircraft would 
be two. 
(1) Each aircraft averages 1, 200 flying hours per year . 
(2) 2 , 600 multiplied by 1, 200 ho urs equal s 3, 120, 000 flying 
hours per year . 
(3) Each engine averages 800 hours b efore rem oval. 
(4 ) 3, 120 , 000 flying hours per year di v ide d by 800 hours of 
engine life e qual 3 , 900 engines. 
(5) 3, 900 engines multiplie d by 2 engines per aircraft e qual 
7, 800 total engines per year . 
(6) 7, 800 engines per year divided by 365 days equal 21 engine s 
per day. 10 
The following data is presented to illustrate the d iffer ence i n 
initial investm ent costs between surface transportation a n d airlift for 
the aircraft engine s t hat would be in transit at any particular time. 
9Air Force Form 1 10B. 
1 Ocornpile d from information contained in U.S.A.F. Spares Stud y 
Group, W right-Patterson AFB , Ohio, 1960, R eport No. 10. 
Value of One Day 's 
E ngines in Shipment 
(21 Engines) 
$4. 2 million 
$4. 2 million 
Days Required 
for Shipment 









'$42 0 million 
$ 16 . 8 million 
$40 3. 2 million 11 
The Air Force woul d have to purchase 2, 016 more engines if it 
used surface t,:ansportation than it would if airlift were used. This 
means that $403.2 m i llion is saved on the initial investment if airlift 
is L!Sed. When highly compl ex electronic equipment and parts are con-
sidere d it is apparent that the use of airlift would permit fewer to be 
purchased resulting in conside rable savings. 
Packaging and Crating . --The Rand Corporation, an independent 
research organization, complete d a study for the Air Fo rce in 1952 on 
the costs of shipment of supplies by surface transportation and by air -
lift . One facet of the study pertaine d to the requirements for packaging 
and crating necessary for each means of shipment. It was estimated in 
the report that for surface shipment at least 35 per cent of the weight 
was for packaging and crating . It also reported that the crating f or 
airlift shipment w a s practically nil. 12 T he heavy cra ting tha t is re -
quired for surface shipment can be a ttributed to stacking the cargo 
layer upon layer and to the forces exerted on the cargo during the nor-
1lcompiled f ro m information contained in U.S. A. F. Spa res Study 
Group, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1960, Report No • . 10. 
l2u.s. Congress , Senate , S tudy of the Military Air Tran sport 
Servi c e, 85th Gong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 107. 
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mal and sudden starting and stopping which tend to shift the cargo . 
Tie-down facilities, which transport aircraft utilize, would probably 
reduce the damage to the cargo and therefore reduce the requirement for 
crating if uti l ized on surface shipm ents. 
It is significant to note a l so that in a study performed by Dougla s 
Aircraft Company on 1. 5 million suppl y items, se l ected at a g iven time 
during 1958, 90 per cent of the items weighed 100 pounds or l ess, and 
99 per cent weighed below 500 pound s . 13 This should mean also that 
99 per cent of the airlift could be carried in present MATS or CRAF 
aircraft because the doors would permit entry to any item weighing l ess 
than 500 pounds . S ize of the cargo would not be a problem in 99 per 
cent of the cargo . 
As a result of the Rand Corporation study it can be concluded 
that the use of airlift re duces the weight of a shipment by 35 per cent 
from what it would be by surface transportation. The United S tates 
Government is paying 35 per cent above the actual weight of the ship-
ment. 
Air lift of P ersonnel. --As the use of airlift has reduced the total 
requirement for spare parts and equipment because of the red uction in 
the intransit time, so has the air l ift of personnel to overseas areas re -
duced the total re quirement for personnel. Airlift , because of its spee d, 
is proving to be the most de s i red m ethod of shipment of personnel to 
overseas destinations . This do es not m ean that the handling or proces-
1311 U. S.A. F. Mulls D ouglas Cargo Study, 11 Airlift, November 1 96 0 , 
p. 43 . 
sing of passengers is more efficient by air shipment than by rail or 
surface shipme n t. When the maintenance of a particular size force 
is necessary, it can be accomplished by airlift with much fewer per -
17 
sonnel. Through the use of airlift, the en route time of each individual 
shipping to an over seas point is reduce d from sixteen days to two days. 
The difference in travel time emphasizes the advantage of airlift and 
is illustrated in an excerpt from ~irlift magazine: 
It has been estimated that in fiscal 1959, MATS will transport 
325, 000 Air Force personnel with a saving of 14 days of travel 
per person flown. This means in effect that it has 12, 63 0 ad-
ditional personnel in productive employment. It also means that 
it has been able to close two primary personnel centers, making 
available an additional 1, 35 0 peopl e for use in other Air Force 
jobs. These savings are equivalent, according to Gen. Tunner, 
t o the authorize d personnel for three heavy bomber wings. 14 
In fiscal year 1963, a ccording to the A ir Force Times in a Jan-
uary 1964 issue, MATS and CRAF airlifted a total of 1, 300,000 per-
sonnel to overseas destinations or return to the U.S.A. It is assumed 
that at l east 400, 000 were Arm y personnel because of the increase in 
the number of special exercises conducted in fiscal year 1963. Con-
sidering the reduction of the intra.nsit time from sixteen days to two 
days, if 400, 000 were airlifted it would be a saving of 5, 600, 000 man-
day s (400, 000 personnel x 14 days). Divide 365 days into 5, 600,000 
man-days and it e quals 15, 342 personnel saved by the use of a irlift. 
This is in excess of an a r m y division. Not only would there be the sav-
ing of the personnel but the expenditure for trucks, t a nks , artillery, 
guns , buildings, and supplies would be saved. 
1411 MATS New Strategy: S e ll Airlift, 11 Airlift, May 1959, pp . 36 - 38. 
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How much the Army could be reduced in total strength as a 
result of the use of airlift is unknown because one does not know what 
the Army will be committed to perform. Therefore, no attempt wi ll 
be made to establish a numerical figure for a reduction . If the Army 
uses airlift exclusively and ships 800, 000 personne l , approximately 
31, 000 personnel would be saved, or the Army could reduce its force 
b y 3 1, 000 personnel. 
A precedent has been established by Great Britain in reducing 
the size of its ground forces. Great Britain has followed a policy since 
1957 of airlifting its forces to troubl esome areas, both b y military air-
craft and commercial aircraft. From the following article it is readily 
seen that air lift is necessary for Great Britain's ground forces: 
When Great Britain asked the Unite d States and its other North 
Atlantic Treaty allies to consider stationing peacemaking troops on 
the island of Cyprus, it onl y served to i ll ustrate that Britain's mi-
litary committments have not decreased commensuratel y with her 
divo r cement from colonial responsibilities. 
With an army of only 170, 000 men, p l us 15, 000 Gurkha troops, 
Britain has soldiers stationed all over the globe. Some 400 British 
commandos landed at Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, on January 25 to 
que ll a new outburst of mutiny. Some 6, 000 British troops are pa-
trolling Cyprus, and another 2, 000 are stationed on Malaysia ' s 
borders with Sarawak and Sabah (No rth Borneo). Rebe l Tribesmen 
in the So uth Arabian Federation pin down 5, 000- m en in the Aden 
garrison. 
The contigent in British Guiana is being halve d to about 75 0. 
Other Commitments includ e garr i sons of 700 men in Gibraltar, 
about 5, 5 00 in Hong K ong, 6, 000 in Kenya, 1, 500 in Libya, 3 , 000 
in Malaya , and 60 0 in Swaziland. There are 53 , 000 British troops 
in the Rhine Arm y, and 1, 000 in West Ber l in . (West Germany and 
the United S tates are the onl ;· NA T O countries fHrni shing their full 
commitment of troops in the fi e ld. ) The United King dom itself is 
garrisoned by abo ll t 80, 000 men. 15 . 
15"Thin Line of Heroes," El Paso Times, February 8, 1 964, p. 4-A. 
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The above procedure of airlift ing troops to vital areas after trouble 
arises has proved effe ctive for Great Britain . The United S tates has fol-
lowed a policy of maintaining a large force of troops in Europe and the Pa-
cific area since W orld War II. However, S ecretary of D efense Robert 
McNamara and Secretary of S tate D ean Rusk have told the NAT O countries 
that the Unite d States intends to decrease the Army units in Germany. 
S ecreta ry McNamara stated that the d ecrease would save NATO contribu-
tions for maintaining this l arge fo rce in the field with no loss in the ability 
to withstand any a ggression . 16 Airlift, according to Secretary McNamara, 
could put the forces into position in plenty a£ time. This rr,obility would 
permit a reduction in the size of the total army units . 17 
A precedent has already been established by the Royal Air For ce 
fo r t h e use of airlift in this manner. 
It would be an undesirabl e extravagance, however, to 
attempt to maintain large balanced forces in each theatre 
sufficient to undertake limited-war operations. Further -
more, in the rapidl y changing pattern of world events it is 
quite impossibl e to forecast with any degree of accuracy where 
or when trouble may arise. 
This has led to the concept of a central strategic reserve of 
troops with the ability to deploy rapidly to any part of the world. 
S uch mobility calls for air transport and for this purpose Transport 
Command in the Unite d Kingdom is being built up . 18 
The words of Wing Commander C. W. Hayes, Royal Air Force , in 
1959 l end credibility to the policy of airlifting troops to trouble areas while 
l 611 P eriscope, 11 Newsweek, May 8, 1964, p. 16 . 
17Ibid. , p. 16. 
l 811 The Operational P osture of the Royal Air Force, 1 959, 11 
Air University Quarter l y R eview, Montgomery, Ala., Summ er 1959. 
20 
maintaining fewer personnel i n service, The extens ive use of airlift 
permits sizable re ductions i n total arm y strength, and its use should b e 
applie d in the following manner: 
1. Normal rotation of individual s to and from overseas. 
2, Rotation or p l acem ent of complete army uni ts. 
3 . Special exercises to insure the e fficiency of both MAT S and 
the army units. 
Though the use of air l ift to move personnel of the Arm y would p er -
mit greater reductions in A r m y strength than it woul d for the A ir Force 
or Navy because of the l arger number of Arm y personnel being moved, 
air lift would render savings to the Air Force and Navy in proportion to 
the nu m ber of personnel airlifted, 
Summary . --Airlift has economic advantages because of its speed, 
long range, and packag ing re q uirements over surface transportation .. I t 
was used as a basis for closing down five lar ge overseas depots , which re -
sulted in estim a ted savings as follows : 
(1) P ersonne l strength d ecreased by 40, 000 
(2f Sa ving of Operation and M aintenance funds 
from closing of five A ir Force depots 
( 3) Storage space saved at $2 . 25 per squa re foot 
($2 . 25 x 10 , 0 00, 00 0 square feet ) 
$200,000,000 
5 0,000 , 000 
22 , 5 00, 0 00 
Other savings f rom the use of air lift by the A ir Force are: 
(1) Reduction of intransit time from 1 6 to 2 days 
(1 3, 98 0 p ersonne l x $5,000 annual salary) 
(2) Reduction of inventory levels (spares ) by one -
third (Appendix B ) 
{3) Initia(Investment decrease on aircraft engines 
69,900,000 
444,000 , 000 
4 0 3,200,000 
2 1 
This is an estimated saving of $1,1 89.6 million that the Ai r 
Force has realized through the use of air lift. 
The Army and Navy will be able to effect comparabl e savings 
in som e of the same areas as the Air Force, such as 
(1) Red uction of 3 1,000 personnel (16 days to 2 
days ) ( 3 1, 000 x $ 5, 000 annual salary) 
(2) Reduction of inventory levels (spares ) 
Plus 
(1) Storage space reductions. 
(2 ) Closing of some suppl y depots. 
$ 155,000,000 
444,000,000 
$599 , 000 ,000 
Sufficient air lift will be available for all branches of the military 
services and total savings of approximate l y 2 billion dollars should be 
attained if extensive use of airlift is made. 
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CHAP T ER IV 
P R OCUREMENT AND MANUFACTURING ASPECTS 
P rocurement. --Stability in the procure m ent of aircraft h as certain 
econom ic a d vantages in that " feast o r famine " conditions could be elimi -
nated, thereby reducing the ~nit cost of the p~oduct . It would provide 
steady em ployment , eliminating excess capacity and probabl y night- shift 
operations that increase the cost of the produ ct. However , these are not 
the present conditions. The A ir Force has always had the probl e m of 
securing enough new a dvanced aircraft for a ll its major commands. In 
this effort to provid e adequate aircraft the Air F orce ha s fo llowed a po -
licy in its procurem ent that a "planning body" determ ine d what the air-
craft sho uld be ab l e to accomp.li sh. Ai rcraft. manufacturers then s ub -
mitted designs and the A ir Fo rce sel ecte d the one design it f e lt coul d 
best accompli sh the objectives . Of course , there were certain limita-
tions , such as the price per aircraft, etc . 
S ince W or ld W ar I much has d e pend e d on the political and econo-
m ical conditions prev ailing at the time rather than on the true needs for 
the d evel opment and per fo rmance of an aircraft. F or instance, appro -
priations for new aircraft were not generally made when the economy was 
d epressed. It has always been easier t o get funds fo r new aircraft when 
the economy was booming . For example , the D epartment of D efense in 
1948 had e stallished the nee d for a 70 W ing Air For ce minimum.l 
lPoyntz Tyler, A irways of Am erica (New York: H. W. Wilson C o., 
1958) , p . 31. 
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Du r ing the recession of 1949 and early 1950 Secretary of Defense 
Louis Johnson decreased the Air Force to a 43 W in g level. How ever, 
this r e cessionary period would have b een an excellent time to award 
n ew contracts for aircraft as a stimulus to the economy. 
This dependence on "good times~' for the Air Force, and also 
the aircraft man ufacturer, created a 11 feast or famine 11 condition . 
These conditions are generally a result of uncertainty in the federal 
budg et, which l eads to uncertainty in procurement for those companies 
that rely primarily on government contracts . Donald Douglas, Sr., 
Pr e s i d ent o{ Douglas Aitc:caft Company, explained the condition when 
h e stated that he received a telegram on V -J day cancelling every con-
t ract the company had. Douglas said that he had 90 thousand p e ople em-
ploy ed at that point and it was necessary to lay them all off. 2 This c e r-
tain ly is n ot the onl y problem that the manufacturer must face; however, 
it is one that has constantl y plagued him. 
Manufacturing Aspects. --It should be recognized at this point that 
an aircraft manufacturing company, to some degree, is a quasi-publi c 
utility. The company makes its profit, or los s, primarily on government 
contracts and therefore must operate withing certain governmental restric-
tions. If its profits on government contracts exceed 7 per cent, it must 
refund to the government all profits in excess of this percentage. 3 
2Ibid., p. 30. 
3F r anklin G. Moore, Manufacturing Management (Hom ewood, Ill.: 
Richard D . Irwin, Inc., 196 1}, p. 719. 
Aircraft manufacturing requires large plant, e quipment, and 
capital outlays; consequently, the number of manufacturers within 
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the industry is kept small. Competition within the in dustry is keen 
becuase one contract can keep the production lines rolling from four 
to five years. The controversy that a rose in 1963 over the award of 
the TFX all- service interceptor plane contract resulted in the resigna-
tion of S ecretary of Navy F red Korth. 
Consequently, this competition among the aircraft manufacturers 
affects the "breakeven point . " Normally, a manufacturer producing 
a new aircraft does not begin to "breakeven" for two or three years . 
Suppose the "breakeven" point is determined to be the fiftieth aircraft 
produced and sold. The manufacturer will naturally accelerate production 
in order to get as much of the market as possible before the competition 
can catch up, thereby reaching the " breakeven" point quickly. This ac-
celerated production method leads to excess capacity. Lar ge numbers 
of workers are hired in the beginning to increase production; competitors 
produce a similar aircraft or one possibly a litt l e superior in its perfor-
mance, and as orders decrease workers are laid off. 
The Air Force contributes to this same production cycl e in another 
manner. As performance of new aircraft normally exceeds that of older 
aircraft being replaced, the Air For ce undertakes accelerating the pro-
duction of new aircraft to get them into operation. When enough new air-
craft are operating, demand de creases , and this adds to the flu ctuating 
production cycl es prevalent in the aircraft industry. 
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It is possible tha t the "feast and fam ine " cycles that prevent the 
manufact urer's fu ll uti lizat iOn of his economiC resources may never be 
sol ve d. However , it is entirely possible to l evel out the flu ctuations by 
stabilizing the pro duction cycle. 
Som e Aspects of Airc raft Replacement. --The end of the Korean 
War initiated a lar g e scal e replacement program to equip the Air Force 
with more advanced aircraft; the program took advantage of new develop-
m ents in technology and retired some World War II aircraft that were ob-
solete. The Kor ean War awakened the Unite d S tates to the a dvancements 
made by Soviet Ru s sia in air power since the end of World War II. It was 
an opportunity to test the latest jet propulsion fighter aircraft that the 
United States had in production. The Korean War opened the jet propul-
sian era and made evi dent the feas ibility of jet propulsion for use with all 
types of a ircraft. 
As a resu lt of lessons l earne d in the Korean War, the prevalent 
strategic viewpoint was that if a war were to occur it would be a general 
all-Out war, and the S trategic Air Command (SAC) would deliver the knock-
out b low with its fast jet bombers . Conseque~tly, - there were no funds 
avail able to modernize MATS 1 airlift capability to keep pace with the stra-
tegic force as Air Force funds were needed to modernize the Strategic, 
Tac tical, and Air Defense Commands. MATS, which had the responsibility 
of airlifting SAC personnel and equipment to overseas areas, became badly 
obsolete in a period when the Air Force's offensive and defensive arms 
were rapidl y converting to an all-jet propulsion force. 4 The reason given 
by Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan F. Twining for not modernizing MATS 
4u. S. Congress, Senate, S tudy of the Militar y Air Transport Service , 
85th Gong., 2nd S ess. , 1958, p . 132. 
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was purel y a budg etary one, There wer e n ot sufficien t funds available 
and the offensive and defensive aircraft m u st come first, 5 
Afte r seve ral special exercises , s uch as "Big Slam," in which 
MATS and the commercial carriers airlifted units of the Army or 
Strategic Air Command to overseas areas, it became evident that the 
airlift c apability of the United States must be modernized to k eep pace 
with rapidly changing world conditions, General Max well Taylor had 
long ar gue d that limite d warfare was more of a probability than a general 
a ll- out war . When G eneral Taylor was m a de Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff in 1961 the emphasis shifted to being better prepared to combat a 
limited war situation. 6 Congress, as explained in Chapter I, provided 
nece ssary fu n ds in 1960 to be gin an interim modernization program tha t 
would give MATS the capabilit y of supporting the Army and its limited war 
re quir e ments, 
One of the means that MATS could use to be prepared to provide this 
support is through the annual budget, If funds w ere made available on an 
a nnual basis, the purchase of replacement aircraft on the same basi s would 
be possible. In this way, each year a part of the airlift fleet would have 
the latest technological improvements added, This do es not m e an that a 
totally differ ent type of aircraft would be procure d each year but that an 
improved series of a model current ly in use would be procured, Fo r ex-
ampl e , the series of the Boeing 707/C-135 now in production has the turbo-
fan engine s which are more efficient and have a highe r performance than the 
5u. S, Congress, S enate, St ud y of the Militar y Air Transport Service, 
85th Gong., 2nd Se ss ,, 1958, p. 133 , 
~eport of Special S ubcommittee on National Military Airlift of the 
Committee on Armed S ervices, Hous e of R epresentatives, 85th Gong ., 
2n d S e ss. 
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earlier engine mode l. 7 It is assumed that, unless a major breakthrough 
in technology is made, such as an e ffici ent rocket engine a dapted for air-
craft use , a m odern airlift fleet c a n be maintain e d by improving the mo-
del currently in production. A good ru l e of thunb to use for replacing 
the type of aircraft in use is to use the depreciation period. If the air -
craft are depreciated over an eight- yea r period the aircraft t ype should 
be replac e d at the end of this period. 
Use of the above proce d ure in purchasing would permit the manu-
facturer to l evel out the flu ctuations in his production cycle . Attaining 
this stability in the manufacturing process should result in prod uction 
of a ircraft at a lower unit cost by utilizing the standard 40 hour work 
week. As the work week is increased the unit cost sta rts increasing . 
If the manufacturer has to acce l erate production, his costs will be af-
fected in this way , accor ding to D r . Franklin E. Moore: 
For several reasons first - shift (day-shift) 
production costs l ess thru1 second-shift (night-.shift) 
production. The night-shift has more new men than the 
day - shif t and both ab senteeism and turnover (men quit-
ting ) are higher . Also, night men do too muc-h during 
the daytim e and come to work tired. All of this cuts 
effic iency and boosts costs. 
Night-shift work is likel y to b e onl y 8 0 to 90 per 
cent as e ffi c i ent as day - shift work. Sometimes this do esn ' t 
show in the recor d s , however, b ecause troub lesom e jobs a re 
a ll done on the first shift . Nigh t men chiefly get easy job s and 
long r uns. 
Night men a re also paid a shift differential, an extra wage 
over day m en amoun ting to about 5 per cent. Add together low-
er o utput a n d higher wages and you will find that prod ucts made 
7Personal l etter from Robert W. Smart. 
at n i ght are likely to cost 20 per cent more than 
products made on the day-s hift . 8 
Therefore, the desirable method of production to achieve the 
lowest unit cost is that of a straight da y - shift operation . 
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S ummary. --The progress of military airlift has been rapid in 
recent years when one takes into account aircraft performance. It 
h as not been quite so rapid from an organizational or procedural as-
pect. However, the commercial carriers ' sha re of the airlift h a s 
been increasing since 1959, and MATS has been inching closer to i ts 
true ro l e of providing airlift for special military exercises . MATS 
can maintain a modern fleet of ai rc1·aft with flexibilit y io meet all}' 
emergencies if a systematic, planne d proc urement program is fol-
lowed. S uch a program would, a l so , at the same time allow the 
m anufa cturer to stabilize his production so that the unit costs could 
be held to a minim um. This wo uld be advantageous to both MATS 
and the manufa cturers . 
8F ranklin E. Moore, Manufactur ing Man a gement (Homewood, Ill.: 
RichardD. I rwin, Inc., 196 1), p. 110. 
CHAP T E R V 
A IR LIF T RE QUIREMENTS 
Size of A irlift Force . --The size of the airlift force should onl y 
be lar ge enough to air l ift 1 , 200, 000 passengers and 230, 0 0 0 tons of 
cargo annually as shown in Appendix D , Table I V, plus those air-
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craft necessary to perform the hard-core mission . CRAF should have 
an airlift force large enough to handle the routine air l ift function, while 
MATS ' size shoul d be adequate to perform its hard -core mission. To 
perform the above missions CRAF should be equipped with 78 jet trans -
port aircraft and MA T S with 7 0 jet transport a i rcraft. With such are-
duction in the size of the air li ft force there will be comparable reduc-
tions in the flight and ground support personnel . 
To determine the size of the airlift force necessary, some assump-
tions first were necessary because data on the hard-core mission is li -
mited for security reasons . F irst, in the event of a general war the re -
quirements for air l ift will not be as great as in previous years. This is 
because of the increase d range of the B - 52, an eight - jet engine bomber 
capabl e of bombing any world- wide targets and returning to its home 
base. Staging bases are no longer needed for the B -52; conse q uently, 
no support re q uirement is needed of MAT S . S econdly, the pr imary 
requirement will be for air lift of A rmy units in a limited war situation. 
Thirdly, the Tactical Air Command will be l argely self-supporting with 
the activation of additional C -1 30E s q uadrons. Und er these assumptions, 
it is probable that much of the continuous airlift requirement over the 
first few day s in a limited war situation will be the airlift of personnel. 
Considering the above assumptions, which should reduce the total 
hard-core airlift re qui rement from what it has been in the past, it ap-
pears that Secretary of D efense McNamara has to face the prospect of 
increasing airlift costs. The following statement is i llustr a tive of the 
problem; 
P entagon--D e fe nse S ecretary McNamara's plan to build up U.S. 
airlift capability faces one big obstacle--the price. To fly a 
division(about 14, 000 men and 28, 00 0 tons of equipment) 
ove rseas with the transport p lanes now on h a nd takes almost 
a month . McNa.mara wants to be read y to move two divisions 
on a week's n otice, but the extra jets (plu s upkeep for a year ) 
would cost $3.5 billion. 1 
The cost referred to by Secretary McNamara is one reason why 
CRAF should be given the responsibility for airlifting the majority of 
the routine airlift. This would permit MATS, with its 70 aircraft, to 
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engage in the special exercises with the Army and Marines, and handling 
the nuclear weapons that must be airlifted. 
The airlift of nuclear weapons is a critical area which MATS must 
handle. P resent laws controlling nuclear materia l prohibit the commer -
cial carriers from participating in this airlift responsibility. MATS' 
capability, with its 70 aircraft , would be adequate to perform this mis-
sion. 
In the following breakdown, the capabilities of MATS and CRAF, 
after their modernization, will be shown for the purpose of illustrating 
what the total capability will be compared to the projected annual require -
1 
"The Periscope," Newsweek, June 25, 1962, p . 14. 
3 1 
ment. The statistics used are an average based on four different type 
aircraft, C-141( 1 32) , C-135(30), C-130E(50), a nd the C-l33B(50) . 
The figures in p;,.rentheses a~e the total number of that partic~la; type 
of aircraft that MATS will possess. The original standards were extracted 
from a do cument "Strategic Airlift C-141 S tarlifter " provided the author by 
Lockheed Ai rcraft Company. 
MATS Capability (272 Aircraft) 
Load Capacity equals personnel or 30 tons of cargo 
Daily Utilization equals 8 flying hours per aircraft 
Monthl y Utilization equal s 240 flying hours per aircraft 
Monthly flying hours for 272 aircraft equal 65, 280 flying hours 
CRAF Capab1lity (280 Aircraft) 
240 flying hours per m onth per aircraft e q uals 67,200 flying hours 
This monthly flying hour capability of 65, 280 hours for MATS and 
67,2 00 hours for CRAF gives a combines monthly flying hour capability 
of 132,480 hours. This would be 116,0 16 flying hours in excess of the 
peacetime projected requirement , or 479 excess aircraft . Beginning 
with the projected annual peacetime airlift re qui rement of 1, 200, 000 
passengers and 230, 000 tons of cargo, from Appendix D, Table IV, it 
is broken down to a monthly basis; 100,000 passengers and 19, 167 tons 
of cargo would have to be air lifte d. If the trips are d ivided e qually be-
tween the Atlantic and P acific theaters of operation, the airlift would 
requir e 1 6,464 flying hours, as shown in A ppendix E , Tabl e V, or 70 
a ircraft . In considering the air l ift re q uirements it would not be possibl e 
to achieve 100 per cent load capacity on each fli ght because of numerous 
factors such as the lack of cargo or passengers availabl e for the scheduled 
day of departure. Therefore, for the purp ose of this an alysis, the average 
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load capacity has been established at 80 per cent, Add 20 per cent to 
the monthly requirement of 16, 464 fly ing hours and a monthly flyin g 
hour re qnirement of 18, 757 hoLJrs is established. This is equal to 78 
air craft ( 16, 464 ~ 240). 
With such a surplus of airlift capability that will be available in 
1965 with the deliver y of the C-141, 2 the airlift fleet should be decreased 
to the size its requirements call for, with an allowance made for unfore-
seen requirements, lo sses due to accidents, etc. The aircraft to be main-
tained b y CRAF and MATS should be the most modern , the C-141, and the 
surplus should be disposed of. MATS has on order 132 of the C-141 1s comp-
are d t o its rcquireme:1t for 70. Th<: last 62 on the crder should be ca:1-
celled or l ease d to CRAF members. The other types of aircraft possessed 
by MATS should be transferred to other major commands in the Air Force 
or l e ased to CRAF members to the extent they would improve the CRAF 
with more modern aircraft. With CRAF providing the majority of the 
rou tine airlift, MATS aircraft would be released for the special exer-
cises and the hard-core mission. 
As with MATS, CRAF will probably have a surplus of aircraft. 
If CRAF modernized its fle et along with MATS, it would have a surplus 
of approximatel y 202 aircraft based on military airlift requirements. 
This would necessitate CRAF disposing of its least economical aircraft 
or finding new sources of airlift. 
2Lockheed-Georgia Co,, Strategic Airlift C-141 Star lifte r, Marietta, 
Geo rg ia, 196 3, p. 22. 
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However, there is a qu estion th a t sh o uld be answered at this 
point . The disposal of surplus aircraft b f MAT S would in clude the 
C-133B which handles the outsize cargo . This disposal would create 
no problem as the C-141 , with some minor modifications, is capabl e 
of moving the "Minuteman" missile. The Minuteman-loaded SSCBM 
(shipping and Storage Cont.ainer Ballistic Missile ) rolls straight in at 
truckbed height from its special trailer. The pressurized and air 
conditione d cargo compartment affords maximum environmental pro-
tection to sensitive components. The C-1 4 1 can also haul one or more 
of a ll mode ls of strategic or tactical missiles that require overseas de -
ployment. 3 The capability of the C-141 not only reduces the number of 
aircraft required for the airlift mission but it has other concurrent eco -
nomic advantages as well . 
Air craft Crew Requirements.--The crew requirements of CRAF and 
MATS will be reduced because of the fewer number of aircraft required 
to perform the airlift mission. MATS, in the past, has operated on a basis 
of two flight crews for each aircraft assigned in its manning policy. 4 
MATS, with a requirement of 70 aircraft versus 272 assigned, woul d need 
140 flight crews for the 70 aircraft and 544 flight crews for 272 aircraft . 
MATS would have a surplus of 404 flight crews that could be transferred 
to other Air Force units. If the same criteria of two flight crews per 
aircraft is used for CRAF, there woul d be a surpl us o f 4 10 crews from the 
3L ockheed-Georgia Co., Strategic Airlift C- 141 Starlifter, Marietta, 
Georgia, 1963, p. 15. 
4Stanley H. Brewer and Roger B. Ulvestad, The Cargo-Jet In 
Military Air Transportation, Renton, Wash., 1960, p. 55 . 
military a ir lift if CRAF re d uced their number t o 78 . 
There i s n o indication that MATS or CRAF would retain all of 
the personnel they now h a v e i f their aircraft w a-s re d uced to what the 
a ir lift mission requires . As new aircraft are r eceived that can do 
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three or fou r times the work of their pre d ecessors, it is on l y natural 
to c ut down the n umber of aircraft, fl i ght crews , and groun d support 
personne l if full economi c advantage i s to be gaine d. 
Ground S upport P ersonnel. --It h a s been said that i t is always 
the gr ound support persormel tha t make a system work in the military 
service . Cons e qu entl y , this is true in MATS , and especially so in 
the air lift busi'less . MA.T S h a s supported the ai:::Eft mission on a 
basis of 5 .12 ground support per sonnel to one fli ght crew m e mber. 
This fi g ure was derived from the fo llowing: 
Direct E xpense F unctions : 
Crews 
Fie ld and O rganizational Maintenance 
Indirect E xpense Functions: 
Admin istration 
Groun d Maintena nce 
Ground Op era tions 
Squadron Overhead 
T raffi c 









14, 17 4 
Headquar ters MAT S overhead an d independent 
Unit suppo rt 6 17 
Total Man -Y e a rs employed in the Strategic 
T ransport Mi ssion 29, 55 15 
5u. s. Congress, Senate, S tudy of M ilitary Air Trafl sport S e rvice, 
85th Gong ., 2nd S ess ., 1958 . 
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If MATS aircraft assignment strength was held at 272 with a 
crew assignment of 544 the ground support personnel re quire d would 
be 16 , 712 (3, 264 crew members multiplied by 5 .12} compared to 4, 30 1 
(840 x 5. 1Z} if the aircraft assignment was limited to 70. If the ratio of 
ground support personnel to 1 flight crew member is increased to 8 to 1 
from 5 . 12 to 1 because of the increased compl exity of e quipment, then 
the ground support personnel would be increased to 26,112 for 272 air -
craft . For 70 aircraft assigne d at a ratio of 8 to 1 it would require 
6, 720 (840 crew members multiplied by 8} ground support personnel. 
Therefore a saving of 19,392 personnel would be gained when MATS was 
limited to 70 aircraft. 
It should be pointed out that CRAF m e mbers would not re quire the 
same ratio of ground support personnel to fli ght crew personnel because 
MATS p rovi des CRAF membe rs traffic and operations clearing services. 
Summar y .--The annual airlift requirements require an airlift force 
of 78 aircraft for CRAF and 70 aircraft for MATS. CRAF will have a force 
of 280 aircraft and MATS will have a force of 272 aircraft. This force is 
far in excess of that required and should be cut back to that required prior 
to getting the larger number on hand from the manufacturer . 
CRAF should handle the majority of the projected requirement of 
1, ZOO, 000 passengers and 230,000 tons of cargo. MATS would airlift 
special cargo of a critical nature and conduct special exercises in pre-
paration fo r its wartin1e mission. 
In addition to the economic advantages modern type aircraft give to 
airlift by re ducing the number of aircraft required it provides for savings 
in the number of flight crews required for CRAF and MATS. This has con-
current econom ic gains in that the number of ground support personnel re-
quired for MATS will be reduced from 26 , 112 personnel to 6, 720 personnel , 
more than enough to completely man a B-52 wing . 
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CHAPTER VI 
INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF AIRLIFT 
Integration of Airlift.--An integrate d system, which utilizes 
MATS and CRAF, appears to be a lo gical step in the deve lopm ent of an 
airlift policy. W e l earned in World War II and the Kor ean War that 
CRAF must be relied on heavil y for airlift support. At the beginning of 
both wars, commercial planes and crews were pressed into military air-
lift service. In the Ko .cean War tl1e coinlnercial caTriers were flyin g 
their first trips within 24 hours after being called. 1 If CRAF is to be re-
lied upon in a n eme rgency, however, it must be given enough airlift to main-
tain a modern fleet of ai rcraft . Mr. Robert W. Pres cott , President of 
Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., expressed the need this way: 
To provide the new, heavy-duty, low-cost aircraft essential 
to the defense plans of the country and to provide new large 
car go aircraft with the l ow ton-mile direct flying costs re-
quir e d to expand and serve the airfreight needs of the coun-
try, the civilian carriers must acquire fleets of new, larger, 
faster, and more highly powered aircraft which the manufacturers 
can and will supply when orders justify. 2 
Therefore, CRAF should be given the bulk of the routine airlift in 
peacetime so it will be. prepared to carry out its assigned mission in war-
time. Not onl y should this be done for strategic reasons but also for eco -
1u. s. Congress, Senate, S tudy of Military Ai r Transport Service , 
85th Gong., 2nd S ess., 1958, p . 53 . 
2Ibid., p. 58. 
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nomic ones, as the cost of an integrated s y s t em, comprised of mode rn 
aircraft, is bel ow the cost of a purely military airlift fo rce (see Table IV, 
A ppendix D). 
There is some opposition, however, to placing too much re liance on 
CRAF in emergencies. To better understand the pro and con positions, an 
explan ation of CRAF is appropriate. 
Civil Reserve Air Fleet.--CRAF is a fleet of aircraft, owned b y 
various commer cial carriers, which have been desi gnated to be available 
within a 48 hour period to perform an assigne d military mission in the e-
vent of a n ational emergency. Under the CRAF plan, the participating 
members nave a certain number of trips to perform. The CRAF aircraft 
h ave additional e quipment installed to make them read y for military use. 
The CRAF fleet is reviewed annually by representatives of the commer-
cial carriers that ar e members of CRAF, MATS, and the D epartment of 
- -
Comm erce to bring the fleet up to a current status by adding late model 
type aircraft and eliminating the obsolete types. 3 
There are many problems in the CRAF program that still remain, 
although they should have been resolved many years ago. Opposition to 
the program by the members of CRAF is centered on the following points 
as compiled by the Reed Committee 4 -and given in summary form. 
l. There is n o incentive to be a member of CRAF. The members 
feel, and with justification, that as long as th~y are to provide 
3
" What is T h e Civil Reserve Air Fleet ," MAT S Public Information 
Office R e leas e (S cott AFB, Illinois). 
4A Committee , appointed b y P resid ent E isenhower, of prominent 
businessmen to study the airlift dispute between MATS and the commer -
cial c a rr iers . 
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airlift during a n ation al e m ergency they should ge t special 
c onsideration on airlift procurement during peaceti me opera-
tions . 
z. The D epa rtment of D efense should have the authority to acti -
vate CRAF in any type of em ergenc y situation. The CRAF 
members -fe e l that CRAF should be activated only in an all-out 
or general war s ituation: . The S ec r e tary of Defense cannot ac-
tivate CRAF in a limite d-war situation such as the Viet-Nam 
struggl e . The CRAF members fee l that if they were activ ate d 
in a limited-war s ituation, a n d thus prevented from bidding on 
new contra cts as a resu l t of h a ving their aircraft tied up, they 
would lo se their com petitive position for future airlift business. 
3. CRAF members must exec ute a contract which would obligate 
them-to p e rform. The members fee l that they responde d d epend-
abl y in World War II and the K orean War and that this re quire -
m ent impugns their \ oyalty. But the position of the government 
in reference to the CRAF program a s state d b y the R ee d Com-
mitte e is: 
a. The responsiveness of CRAF is inadequate. Military 
l eaders f ee l tha t the ability ~f CRAF members to res -
pond within a 48 hour period is extr emely doubtful. 
b. Stat utor y l egislation is necessary to enfo rce the execution 
of the contract. While the governme nt do es not qu estion the 
patriotism of any individual, the security of the nat ion is at 
stake and any unnecessary risk i s too m uch. 
It was explaine d this way by Robert W. Smart, Chief Counsel of 
the House Armed Services Committee : 
It is pertinent to note that the responsiveness of CRAF is 
based entirel y on a civil contract. Without impugning the 
patriotism of the crews of the civil aircraft, military 
l eaders obvious l y have serious reservations about the re-
liability of this type of responsiveness . The enactm ent of 
l egislation would be required to improve this situation and 
the subject is currently under consideration, with a view 
of developing a l egislative proposal. 5 
L egislation has not been enacted at this time. However, it is 
still under consideration, and the general conclusions of the House 
Armed Services Committee which met in 19606 are listed below: 
1. That consideration be given to extending the authority 
of the P resident to activate CRAF in national emergencies 
short of general war. 
2 . That commercial airlines be required to execute agreements 
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with their e mplo yees, or empl oyee representatives, that will 
insure no work stoppages in the event their efforts are required, 
as determined by the P resident, to support a national military 
re quirement. 
3. That the D epartment of the Air Force proceed with the develop-
ment of a -program which would insure both an adequate and an 
equitabl e participation of the members in CRAF to meet the con-
tingency of partial mobilization. 
4. That, to the extent of the congressional set-a- side in annual 
appropriation bills, the procurement of civil augmentation 
5Robert W. Smart, Chief Counsel, Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives , P ersonal letter (July 10, 1961). 
6Report of Special Subcommittee on National Militar y Airlift of the 
Committee on Armed Services, H ouse of Representative s, 85th Gong . , 
2nd Sess . 
airlift be initially restricted to the participants of CRAF, 
The differences that exist between government officials and 
CRAF members must be reso lve d to provide the United S tates the 
greatest security. The nation ' s total airlift resources must be as-
sessed and the most effective and economical us e planned for these 
resources. 
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A Comparison of Airlift Systems, --A comparison of the total 
costs of airlift systems will aid in determining the type of airlift struc -
ture that would be most efficient for the United States. To arrive at a 
proposed policy or method of operation, the cost data in Table IV was 
compile d using the fl ying hour requirements from Chapter Ill. In this 
compi l ation, it was necessary to assum e certain common denominators such as 
(1) Average annual sal ary of $5,000 per person. 
(2) Air Transport A ssociation (ATA) estimated cost per flying hour 
for the jet transport aircr a ft --$i , 025. 107 
( 3) MATS estimated cost per flying hour for the jet transport aircraft 
- - $ 852 . 45. 
Moreover, a unique feature of the jet transport, or any jet-propelled 
aircraft , is that one can predict with ext reme acc uracy the performance of 
the aircraft under prevailing weight conditions and weather conditions . 
This me a ns that no matter whether it is a comm ercial j et or a military one, 
the same mode l a i rcraft will give the same perfo r mance. Therefore, as one 
7stanley H . Brewer and Roger B. Ulvestad, The Car go-Jet in 
Military Air Tr a nsportation (R enton, Wa shington : The Boeing Co . , 
1960), p . 28 . 
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can see from Table IV, the initial purchase price of the aircraft c auses 
MATS cost to run high. In considering the economic aspects of airlift 
one can see that it could be advantageous to have the commercial car riers 
perform the routine airlift function because it would result in a saving of 
$406 million, which is the cost of purchasing 70 aircraft for MATS. 
Naturally, the type of airlift system to be adopte d cannot be determined 
on an economic basis a lone . The integrated system, besides being eco-
nomically practical, is desirable for political a n d strategic reasons . 
Moreover, the cost of maintaining the MATS system of aircraft main-
tenance~ traffic, aircraft c l earing and cont:t·ol j_s an aPnlJal c ost regard-
less of whether MATS or CRAF airlifts the routine carg o or passengers. 
Utilization of the MATS system by CRAF would exercise the system ade -
quately so there would be no loss of efficiency. CRAF costs are reduced 
by thettilization of these MATS services. Consequently, these services 
that are provided by MATS reduce the contract cost to the government. 
Summary .-- CRAF should be assigned the bulk of the routine 
airlift if it is to be relied on in wartime . This would permit CRAF 
to main a modern, efficient airlift fleet. There would be economic 
advantages to this policy as CRAF could perform this routine airlift 
function at an annual cost of $230,7 33,600. However , there are strate-
gic reasons that require a MATS fleet also. If MATS were given the 
routine air lift responsibility the cost would be $670, 33 0, 600 p l us approxi-
mately that same amount to perform the special exercises and hard-core 
mission, or a total of $1,340, 667~ 200. Assigning the routine air lift 
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mission to CRAF at a cost of $2 3 0,733, 60 0 and the hard- core mission 
to MATS at a cost of $ 67 0, 33 0 ,600 the total cost would be $ 900, 0 64,200, 
This is still $440, 603, 000 bel ow the cost of what MATS could perform 
the entire air lift function for. 
The integrated system of airlift is the most advantageous system 
because of the economic, strategic, and poli tical reasons , Under the 
integrated system MATS assigned aircraft strength must be held at 70 
aircraft, It is not necessary to place a maximum aircraft strength on 
CRAF, although its requirements would be 7 8 a ircraft, b ecause econo -
mic factors would accomplish this anyway . 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY A ND C ONCLUSIONS 
T he nation should recognize that air lift is an instrument of na-
tional policy and that its potential should be d eveloped a ggr essiv ely 
and efficiently . The tdal a irlift resour ces of the n ation must be pro-
gr ammed for, and utilized, to insure the n a tional security within a 
framework which is financ ially feas ible . 
S ena tor A. M. Monron e y (D emocrat, Ok lah oma), one of the 
U. S. S enate 's most knowl e d geabl e m embers on ai r lift, said this in a 
l etter to the author: 
I bel ieve that we can only have a d e quate airlift b y deve lop-
ing a maximum forc e , both militar y and c ivil. As I share Billy 
Mitche ll' s c oncept that a irpower is a n ati onal produ.ct and not 
purel y militar y , I am still convince d that military airlift must 
b e and that it is not yet organized a long strike force lines a n d 
that the routine logistics job s h ould be done by civi l carriers 
who should be requir e d to m ee t any s t andards of e q uipment 
and availability which the national interest requires. 
I believe that MATS pro c ur e m ent policy should be d esigne d 
to stimulate the purchase of suitable c a rgo aircraft by civil carriers 
and that c onsideration s of cost sho uld b e secondary. W hile the pas-
senger j et transports woul d be us eable in some cir cumstances for 
military purposes, they ar e not satisfactor y a irc raft for the move -
m ent of cargo and combat forc es , and reliance on them for this 
purpose I b e lieve would b e a great mistake . 1 
This can be accomplished through the us e of the resources of both 
MATS and the CRAF m embers . MATS will possess a force of 272 
1Hon . A. M. Monr oney, S enator, State of Oklahoma, W ashington, 
D. C., P ersonal l etter (June 16, 1961 ). 
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modern aircraft transports when its modernization program is complete. 
This force of transports, when combined with the 280 modern transport 
aircTaft of the CRAF would, when based on an eight-ho ur daily utiliza-
tion, permit the airlift, in a one-month period, of more than a million 
passenger s or 336, 000 tons of cargo in the Atlantic zone of operation. 
Because of greater distances involved in the P acific zone of operation, 
the combined capability would be 518,800 passengers, or 155, 65·0 tons 
of cargo. This capability, measured against projected requirements, 
is in excess of what is needed and poses theproblem of how to a llocate 
and program the resources which are available. Therefore, it is 
necessary that airlift be viewed in its proper perspective. MATS must 
be manned and equipped against its wartime mission, and this mission 
only. Airlift of a routine or repetitive nature should be allocated to 
CRAF. In doing this, a stable force of small CRAF members with 
modern aircraft would be built up. With this stable force of air craft, 
any requirement for airlift would be assured of d elivery. 
To insure the availability of the CRAF when it is need ed, it must 
be given the mission of air l ifting the routine traffic. Further, it should 
be required to execute contracts with its e mployees to insure that the 
passengers and cargo will be airlifted. Although the carriers feel that 
this is unnecessar y , the national security must be preserved and not 
left to chance . CRAF responsiveness will not be a matter of concern as 
the CRAF would already be fully exercised as a result of the "routine" 
airlift. The MATS system would be available and fully exercised as a 
result of servicing MATS and CRAF. 
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MATS and CRAF, when used as an integrated team, would provide 
the United States with quick reaction airlift that wou ld have the capacity 
to perform any requirement that might face it . 
One recommendation of all committees which have participated 
in discussions about the operation of MATS is that a greater portion 
of MATS' peacetime capacity shoul d be employed in special exercises 
with the Army and other tactical units which MATS would support in 
wartime . MATS' peacetim e hour l y utilization rate should be held at 
a level which is at least half of its wartime rate, according to the re-
port of th e Ree d Committee, 2 a special committee compo se d of dis-
interested c i vi li;m pe:csonnal, and the RiveTs House of R ep:cesentatives 
Subcommittee . If MATS proje cte d aircraft were flown at h alf of their 
wartime projected utilization, this wou ld take care of the projected 
routine air lift and still leave ampl e capability for special exercises . 
This is not necessary nor is i t the most economi cal air lift policy, a s 
shown in Table IV, Appendix D. 
In addition to increasing the number of special exercises with 
the A rmy and other tactical units, increasing use must be made of 
air lift to suppl y over seas units with add e d high val ue parts. This 
a ir lift would further re du ce the pipe l ine tim e , reduce total inventory, 
and thereby re du ce the a mount of stora ge space re q uire d. Further, 
a substantial increas e should b e made in the number of personne l to 
be airlifted to overseas d estinations , to e ffectivel y utili ze the excess 
air lift capability . The increased use of airlift wo uld then insure econo-
m y in the personnel a nd l ogistics areas. When 1, 20 0,000 passengers 
2"Modernize MAT S, R eed Group Ur ges, " Journal, Vol. XCVII, No . 
33, (April ! 6, 196 0), p. 1. 
47 
are air l ifted, and their in- transi t time reduced from 16 days to 2 days , 
it means an economic gain of 46, 032 personnel to the military services . 
However, in addition to explaining what the air l ift capability would 
be if MATS retaine d the 27 2 aircraft on order, or received, and if CRAF 
retained 280 aircraft, it should be shown tha t the re quirement is only neces -
sary for 70 aircraft in MAT S and 78 inCRAF. CRAF could air l ift, with its 
78 aircraft, the routine req ui rement of 1, 20 0, 000 passengers and 23 0, 000 
tons of car go at a cost of $ 230, 733, 600. However, for strategic reasons 
MATS must handle the special exercises and hard- core mission with its 
fleet of 70 air craft . MATS, to fl y its 70 aircraft, must be authorized 
and manned for 140 flight crews and 6, 720 ground support personnel. 
In consid ering the flight crews and support personnel for CRAF, it must 
be assum e d that economic forces would keep CRAF personnel at the 
proper leve l. 
Therefore, there is a responsibility in the national airlift require -
ment for MATS and CRAF. If the y are given their proper roles a healthy 
aircraft industry will be a reality and national secur ity can be assured. 
If MATS is over -manned with aircraft and personnel , an unhealthy 
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COMPARATIVE AIRCRAFT PRODUCTIVITY 
P -ayload Initial Cost P er 
Initial Cost Max. ~ for 2000 Available Ton Mile 
of for Max. NM~ P er Hr . (Dollars) 
Aircraft Payload~ (Tons ) {3000 -NM) 
$ 650, 000. 00 1330 7 . 35 $ 8 12 .00 
1, 284, 000. 00 24 10 12 . 50 873.00 
1, 200, 000. 00 17 30 1 3. 90 7 46. 00 
1, 747,300.00 1580 11. 86 1,529.00 
I , 646, 406 • 00 I 32 0 I 9. 75 1, 108 . 00 
4 , 7 10, 000. 00 2000 45 . 20 1, 2 18 . 00 
5,800 , 000 . 00 2365 53.00 377 . 00 
I. Brewer , Stanley H . and Ro ger B . Ulvestad, The Car go-Jet 
in Military:_ Air Transportation, January 196 0. 
2. Planning Research Corporation, ·An E conomi c Study of S uper-
sonic Transports, 24 May 1959. 
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TABLE II 
AIRCRAFT INITIAL AND REPLENISHMENT SPARE PARTS 









(In billions of dollars ) 
Initial Spares Replenishment Total 
Spares 
1. 146 o. 304 1.450 
0. 880 0.500 1. 38 0 
0.600 0.680 1.280 
0 . 450 0.750 1.200 
0.229 o. 855 1.084 
0. 116 o. 900 1. 016 
"Se l ective Management of Material," USAF Spares Study 















T A B LE III 
MATS AIRLIF T, INC L UDING C OM MER CIAL 
F ISCAL YEARS 195 1 THROUGH 196 2. 
P assengers Ca rgo-Tons 
Total Jl.1ili!aLy c <rrlt1'El:'Chl Total M ilitary 
992,062 433, 652 558,4 10 29 1,936 156,222 
986, 978 578, 30 3 4 08, 675 269, 364 197,364 
993,209 564,297 428, 912 27 9, 144 2 13,90 6 
925, 603 5 45 , 355 37 9, 248 2 01 ,689 169 , 536 
889, 93 0 530, 563 359, 367 164, 957 146, 00 9 
939, 307 748 , 841 19 0, 4 66 167, 01 3 194,53 1 
848,845 700,25 0 148,595 165,2 17 15 0 , 125 
625 , 742 6 17 , 100 8,642 123,808 120, 5 17 
488,764 440 , 359 48,405 85,08 2 75, 173 
482, 054 38 0,886 10 1, 168 7 9, 10 3 59, 10 9 
435, 18 0 32 3, 145 112 , 0 35 7 6, 11 3 52,862 
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SOURCES: 1. Twenty- Eighth Report b y the Committee on Government Operations, 
Military Air Transportation, Eighty - Fifth C ongress, Second 
Session, June 26, 1 958 . 
2. Air l ift Service Management Reports, Military Air Transport 
Service . 
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Opera tor A/C 




INITIAL COST DATA FOR ROUTINE AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS 
FOR ONE YEAR . 
Annual Total A/C S upport 
P ersomel P rojected tm-c:re.v Costs p perating Personne l 
Rqmt. Load Mo.nl::ers {5. 8 ea.) Costs Costs 
-
6, 720 1, 200, OOOpsgrs 840 $40 6 , 00,0, 000 A TA $230,733,600 $3$00,000 
230 , 000 tons 
16,7 12 1, 200, 000 psgrs '2 64 1, 577,600 ,000 ATA 803,022,336 11 6,200,000 
230, 000 tons 
1, 200, 000 psgrs I 




$ 67 0, 333,600 
2,496,822 , 336 
230,7 33,600 
ATA Estimated Cost Per Flying Hour e quals $ 1,0 25. 10. 
SOURCES: Compiled fom data conta ined in reports : 
1. Milita ry Air Transport S ervice, Airlift Se rvi ce Management Report, July 1958 - June 1962 . 
2 . Brewer , S tanley H . and Roger B . Ulvestad, The Cargo - J et in Military Air Transportation, 


















Round T rips Flying Hours MATS {272 A/C) CRAF ({J!/JA/Q 
250 4,000 
250 ~ 
5 00 11 , 5 00 
160 2, 560 
160 4,800 
32 0 7' 360 
65, 280 67 ,200 
4 10 9, 104 
410 ~ 
820 16, 464 /- ZOo/o 
Compiled from data containe d in: 
1. The Car go-Jet In Military Air Transportation, Renton, 
Wash. , 1960. 
2 . Strategic Airlift C-141 Star lifter, Marietta, Ga., 1963. 
APPENDIX B 
General D escriptions of MATS 
C-141 S tar lifter . --The new Lo ckheed C-141 J et-powered four-engine 
aircraft is being built for the United States Air Fo rce . Slated to enter 
Military Air Transport Service (MATS) global operations in the spring 
of 1 965, it will be capable of airlifting 50,000 pounds of cargo 4, 600 
statute miles, or 20, 000 pounds of cargo nonstop from California to 
Japan, a distance of 6, 325 statute miles. 
C-135 Stratolifter. --The Boeing C -1 35 Stratolifter is the first pure -
jet cargo aircraft in military service . The 500-mph a ircraft, with non-
slop over - ocean range, can fly at twi c e the speed, twice the height, and 
can carry three times the load for a 5 0 per cent greater range than most 
airplanes MATS uses currently. It can carry 38, 000 pounds of payload 
3, 6 00 miles at 40, 000 feet. Basic crew is six. 
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The aircraft, simila r to the Boeing 7 07, is slightl y sm aller in most 
dim ensions . Primarily a cargo carr i er, it c a n be converted to carry 
troops or l itter patients. I t is the only aircraft now used for aeromedical 
evacuation from overseas points to the Unite d States . The first aircraft 
was delivered to MAT S in June 1961. Now a total of 44 are in service with 
MATS , 29 with turbofan engines. 
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C-133 Cargomaster. --The Dou gla s C-133 Cargomaster is the largest 
aircraft in the MAT S global airlift inventory. D esigned to ha ndle outsized 
cargo, the Cargomaster can airlift all U. s. operational missil es. With it 
MATS has cut delivery time, f rom manufacturer to launch site, to hours 
instead of the day s re quir e d b y over land h a uling . 
In D ecember, 1958, a C-1 33 establishe d the world's record for a 
single cargo airlift. I t flew 11 8, 000 poun ds of cargo to an altitude of 10, 000 
feet , t opping previous recor d s b y 40, 000 pounds. T he plane continually 
de monstrates its tremendous capacity by carrying everything from gia nt 
missiles to rocket launche rs. 
T he Car gomaster n ormally operates between 15, 000 and 30, 000 fe et, 
cruising at nea r l y 300 miles pe r hour. With a 20-ton payload, its range is 
more tha n 3, 700 n"liles. It carries a basic crew o f five and is powered by 
four P ratt a nd W hitney T - 34 t urboprop e n gines developing 6, 000 e quiv alent 
shaft horsepower eac h. MATS has 45 of these aircraft, part of them assigned 
to Dover AFB, Delaware, a n d the others to Travis AFB, California. 
C-124 G lobemaster . --The Dou gla s C-124 Globemaster is the backbone 
of MATS' air lift forc e . Introduced to MATS in J une, 1950, it has been in on 
every major airlift since Korea . It has even becom e a mis s i l e carrier, air-
l ifting the Thor IRBM and. its component par ts to England for JRAF use. 
This aircraft has flown cargo airdrop missions fo r seven consecutive 
years in " Operation DEEP FREEZE," the resupply of scientific stations in 
the A nta rc tic . It bore t he brunt of the Chil e, Con go and C ub a n air lifts. 
It can carry 20 0 fully e quipped combat troops or 127 litter 
patients or a 20-ton c a rgo payl oad. With this load it h a s a range of 
1, 808 miles. It s speed is 230 miles per hour a t a normal cruise 
a l titude of 7, 000 to 10 , 000 feet . Its four P ratt an d W hitne y piston 
engines d evel op 3, 800 horsepower each. T he basic crew is six. 
MATS h ad 33 1 C-1241s in the golbal airlift force on M arch 1, 
1963. 
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C-118 L iftmaster . --The Dou glas C-11 8 L iftmaster , one of the very 
dependable passenger and cargo aircraft in MA TS, joined the airlift force 
i n September, 195Z. lt made the first MATS nonstop fli ght a cross the 
Atlantic in e a r l y 1954. The liftmaster had a key ro l e in "Operation SAFE 
HAVEN" when 14,000 Hungarian refugees were airlifted to the U. S. in. 
late 195'6 and earl y 1957. 
The aircraft can carry 60 combat troops and their e quipment and 
can deliver them within a r a nge of 2, 760 miles. It c ruises at 18 , 000 
feet at 276 miles per hour . Basic crew is seven . MATS had 110 lift-
masters in the global air lift force on Mar ch 1, 1963. 
C- 12 1 S uper Conste llation. --The L ockheed C-12 1 S uper Conste llation 
joine d MAT S in 1953 and has been used as a convertible carrier for both 
c a rgo and personnel. It fli es both oceans from its two bas es of operation , 
C h arleston AFB, So uth Caro l ina, and Moffett Naval A ir Station, California. 
Besides nor mal passenger and cargo operations , the C-121 is used on the 
S tate D epartment "embas sy runs " operating into S outh Am erica. 
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The C- 121 cruises at 17,000 feet at 282 miles per hour and 
carries a basic crew of eight. All the Super Constellations can be 
converted for passengers, cargo or air evacuation missions. It can 
carry 76 fully equipped troops over a 3, 050 mile range . MATS had 42 
of these in the global airlift force on March 1, 1963. 
C-130 Hercules .- - The extended-range L ockheed C- 130E He rcules 
provides val uab l e interim modernization to the airlift force of MATS. 
The first several were delivered in August, 1962. 
Refinements over the C -1 30B, already in service, give the high -
wi.nge d He,-cules ].0 tons more gross take-of! weight--155, OCO pounds. 
Also, additional fuel tanks (between the nacelles of the turboprop engines ), 
which each carry 1, 360 gallons, enabl e the "E" version to fly the Atlantic 
nonstop with normal loads , and the Pacific with one stop. Rear loading at 
truck-bed height, ability to land and take off from comparativel y short 
r unways and a relativel y high speed (more than 300 mph) all make this 
aircraft valuabl e for global airlift. 
These C-130E aircraft will he lp fi ll MATS' needs even after pure-jet 
aircraft de signed specifically for car go are avail able in m id- 1964. It s 
normal load is about 16 tons and it can carry 64 combat troops or 74 
li tter patients . MATS had 48 C -1 30 aircraft on March 1, 196 3. Additional 
deliveries are being made each month. 1 
N O T E: Mileage figures are statute. Air speed figures are statute miles / hour. 
1G eneral D escription of MATS Global Airlift Aircraft, MATS Public 
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